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IK THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
:

Case No.
14380

-vs:

ROBERT LEE DIXON,
Defendant-Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Robert Lee Dixon, was convicted
in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, of the crime of the distribution of
a controlled substance for value in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8, (1953, as amended).

The Honorable James

S. Sawaya, Judge, presided.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was found guilty by the jury of
the crime of the distribution of a controlled substance

for value and was sentenced on December 16, 197 5, by
the Honorable James S. Sawaya, to the Utah State Prison
for an indefinite term not to exceed fifteen years.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks an order of this
Court affirming the verdict of the jury and the
judgment of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The appellant was tried on charges of distribution of a controlled substance for value on December
8, 1975, in Salt Lake County.
Sixteen potential jurors were called and sworn
(T.3).

During voir dire the judge asked if any of the

potential jurors were acquainted with the possible
witnesses (T.9).

He then, individually, questioned the

four people who responded that they had all previously
served on juries which had rendered guilty verdicts in
cases that involved at least one of the state's witnesses.
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All four people stated this previous jury experience
would not make any difference in their ability to
render a verdict solely on the evidence presented
in the present case (T.9,10).
After voir dire the prosecuting attorney passed
the panel for cause (T.19).

The defense counsel

requested leave and was granted the right to reserve
any challenges for cause until after the empaneling
process (T.19). The defense counsel and the prosecuting
attorney each used their peremptory challenges.

The

remaining eight jurors, including two of the four
people with similar prior jury experience, were sworn
to try the case (T.19,20).
Following the prosecutor's opening statement
defense counsel challenged for

cause the four afore-

mentioned people on grounds that they had all served
as jurors in cases involving the same charge and the
same state's witnesses (T.23).

The challenge was

denied by the court (T.24).
Salt Lake policemen Michael Roberts and Jerry
L. Mendez (not Kenneth L. Thirsk as alleged in appellant's
Statement of Facts) and an undercover operative v/orking
for the police, Denise Giertz, were the witnesses for
the prosecution.
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Officer Roberts testified that he drove Ms.
Giertz to the vicinity of the West Side Motel, that
she left the car on foot and returned ten minutes
later v/ith a balloon of heroin in her mouth (T.51,52).
Ms. Giertz testified that she walked to the
Regal Lounge where she located the defendant, told
him she wanted to buy some heroin, and he said it
would cost thirty-five dollars (T.37-39).

They then

walked to the West Side Motel, which was two doors
down from the Regal Lounge.

There she gave defendant

$40.00 in exchange for a balloon of heroin. . She
placed the balloon in her mouth, left the motel and
returned to the police car (T.40).
The appellant was called as witness in his
own behalf and denied the occurrence of both the
alleged conversation and the sale of heroin to Ms.
Giertz (T.144).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE OF FOUR MEMBERS OF THE JURY PANEL
WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY SERVED ON JURIES RENDERING GUILTY
VERDICTS IN SIMILAR CASES IN WHICH THE SAME STATE'S
WITNESSES HAD TESTIFIED.

The statute upon which appellant's single
argument is based is Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-19(5)
(1953, as amended), which reads in part:
"A challenge for implied bias
may be taken for all or any of the
following causes and for no other:
(5) having served on a trial
jury which has tried another person
for the offense charged."
As appellant correctly noted in his brief,
one construction of this statutory language is that
a juror is not automatically disqualified to serve
on a jury merely because he previously sat on a jury'
which tried another defendant for the same offense,
but arising out of a separate fact situation.
Respondent submits that this is not only a possible
construction for this language; this is the only
logical construction of this language.
If the legislature had intended such similar,
previous jury service to be automatic grounds for
disqualification of potential jurors it easily could
have specified this in a statute with explicit language
to that effect.

However, the present statute dealing

with implied bias says only that a challenge "may
be taken" for that reason.

Such language does not
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require a court to automatically sustain such a
challenge once it is made.
This section of the statute only.establishes
one of many criteria that must be reviewed and
questioned in order to determine the impartiality,
or lack thereof, of the potential jurors.
fact of similar jury

Once the

experience is shown to exist

it is up to the trial judge to explore further and
determine if this fact will hamper the defendant's
right to an impartial jury.
The role of the trial court in this determination
was defined by the Kansas Supreme Court in State v.
Carpenter, 215 Kan. 573, 527 P.2d 1333 (1974).
"Unless a qualification for
cause is mandatory as a matter of
law under the statute, it presents
an issue of fact to be determined
by the trial court and rests within
the trial court's sound discretion.
The trial court is in a much better
position than this court to view the
demeanor of the prospective juror
and listen to his answers." Id. at
1337.
In the present case the trial court judge
recognized his role and once it was determined that
four potential jurors had sat on similar cases with
some or all of the same state's witnesses, he properly
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and adequately questioned each one, individually,
to ascertain their possible biases in this regard.
These four people all responded that they
understood that these were two distinct and
separate trials.

They further stated that they could

render a verdict solely on evidence received in this
trial (T.9-11).

None of them felt that this previous

experience would influence their verdict in the case
at hand (T.13) .
After this voir dire examination the judge
was satisfied that this previous jury experience did
not render any of these potential jurors biased and
therefore denied defense counsel's challenge for causs
of these four persons (T.24).
A similar situation existed in Disheroon v.
State, 514 P.2d 685 (Okla. Cr. 1973).

In that case

defendant was also charged with unlawful delivery of
a controlled dangerous substance.

Five members of that

jury had rendered a conviction on the same charge
against a different defendant the day before the trial
against Disheroon ccnmenced.

Defense counsel asserted

that the fact that these jurors had decided and rendered
such a conviction was "per se evidence of prejudice of
those five members of the jury."

The court did not

agree with this assertion and after studying the

counsel's voir dire examination on this point the court
concluded:
"The record of counsel's examination
of those jurors is wholly insufficient
to support excusing those jurors for
cause. Since the record does not support
counsel's assignment of prejudice
we find this proposition is without
merit. . . . " Id. at 688.
Federal courts have agreed with the rule that
the record must show that bias exists before a challenge
based on previous jury experience will be sustained.
In Government of Virgin Islands v. Williams,
476 F.2d 771 (3rd Cir. 1973), defendant was charged
with distribution of marijuana and some of the jurors
had served on similar cases involving the same government witnesses.

In answering the defense counsel's

challenge to these jurors the court stated:
"The federal courts have uniformly
held that absent some evidence of
actual partiality, a juror is not
disqualified merely because he previously
sat in a similar case arising out of a
separate and distinct set of circumstances even though the offenses
charged in the cases are similar and
some of the same prosecuting witnesses
testify in each case." Id. at 773.
(cases omitted).
In addition, Haussener v. United States, 4F.2d
884 (8th Cir. 1925), which is referred to in appellant's
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brief, is an early example of the federal court
adoption of this policy.

Appellant contends that

the court in Haussener attached more importance to
saving of the court's time than to protecting
defendant's right to an impartial jury.
very limited reading of the opinion.

This is a

The court did

address itself to the impractibility of requiring
totally new jurors for every case involving a violation;
of the Volstead Act, but then went on to say:
"We are not saying that, if the
jurors had by their answers disclosed
a state of opinion that would have
prevented a fair and impartial trial,
or an unprejudiced consideration of
all of the evidence offered, that
they would be competent jurors;
but it will be observed that no
such state-of mind is shown by the
voir dire examination. . . (a)
novel practice like that here disclosed ought not to be permitted,
except in the face of a situation
clearly showing the bias, prejudice
or lack of impartiality of the juror.
In this the record fails." Id. at 887.
A careful study of the trial record in the
present case will likewise reveal that there is no
merit in defendant's challenge of these four persons.
There was no partiality revealed at all after a
thorough voir dire examination.

Defendant's right to

an impartial jury was in no way jeopardized by the
presence of these four people on the jury panel.

Appellant relies on these rather antiquated
cases to support the proposition that that statute
should be construed to read that jurors with jury
experience in similar cases, involving the same state's
witnesses should be disqualified.

All three cases

can be distinquished from the present case.
Priestly v. State, 19 Ariz. 371, 171 P. 137
(1918) dealt with a defendant charged with selling
intoxicating liquors.

Five members of the jury panel

had just previously served on a jury involving the
same charge against John Duff, a fellow bartender of
Priestly1s.

Duff and Priestly worked in the same

establishment, and planned and used the exact same
scheme to dispose of the intoxicating liquor.

Unlike

the instant case, there was a strong similarity and
relationship of the defendants and their criminal
activity in Priestly.

The two defendants were really

"partners in crime" and the inference of partiality
after having heard one of these cases and rendering
a guilty verdict is much more conclusive than in the
present case where the charge is the same but the
defendants are totally unrelated and the place and
circumstances of each crime are substantially different.
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The same argument can be made against the use
of Popp v. State, 44 Okla. Crim. 220, 230 P.478
(1929).

In that case one of the jurors had served

on a jury which rendered a guilty verdict against the
defendant's mother for the same charge just prior to
commencement of defendant's trial. Again the close
relationship of the defendants and their crimes
made it extremely difficult to accept a finding
of impartiality.
Roberts v. State, 4Ga. App. 378, 61 S.E. 497
(1908) involved a defendant charged with distribution
of alcohol.

The distinguishing factor in that case

is that the trial court did not allow voir dire
examination of potential jurors as to past service
on a comparable jury.

The judge in Roberts, supra,

did not recognize or properly execute his role in this
regard.

The Court of Appeals in this case thought

such questioning was proper and should have been
allowed.
As noted earlier, no such impropriety or abuse
of discretion existed in the present case because the
trial court judge appropriately examined all potential
jurors and directed adequate questions to this specific
point.

One final point should be noted.

Appellant

contends that the jurors with previous experience had
already accepted the credibility of the state's witnesses
and therefore had foreclosed any defense that he might
have had by an attack on the credibility of these
witnesses.
Realistically, however, merely because a juror
accepts that a witness is credible in one case
does not establish that witness1 credibility forever.
Each different fact situation presents different
factors from which the juror can judge the credibility
of each witness.

The circumstances of the case,

the witness1 involvement in the case, the demeanor of
the witness in the courtroom will all vary in any
particular case.

The juror who found a witness1

testimony very credible in one instance may decide that
the same witness is not so credible in a different,
albeit similar, case.
If the juror can maintain an open mind as to
the establishment of credibility of each witness in
every case no significant partiality as to a given
witness will resultf

The jurors involved in the

present case all displayed confidence that they could
maintain an open mind and the judge v/as satisfied with
their appraisal of their ability to be impartial.

His judgment is based on his personal observations and
should be sustained.
CONCLUSION
The Utah statute concerning implied bias should
be interpreted literally.

It should be viewed as

a list of situations which may give rise to implied
bias.

It must be left within the duty of the trial

judge to determine if any such implied bias does in
fact exist in any given case.
The trial court judge in the present case
protected defendant's right to an impartial jury by
properly examining all jurors with previous similar
jury experience.

The determination by the judge that

no implied bias existed due to this factor was within
his discretion and should not be overturned.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

